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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:1384
to ultimately decide whether freedom of the press or the right to a
fair and impartial trial is the "preferred" or "basic" freedom. In a
complex modern society and constitutional form of government,
both of these freedoms merit the maximum legal protection that
the courts can bestow.
FELIX J. ZIOBERT, JR.
SALES - IMPLIED WARRANTIES - lEQUIIIEMENT
OF A SALE
Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991
(D.N.D. 1966).
One defense to a personal injury suit for breach of implied war-
ranty is that no sale occurred to which a warranty could attach.'
The requirement that a sale be involved is often confused with the
privity question, although the two are quite distinct.2 The lack-of-
sale defense has come into play most often in those cases involving
food,8 blood for transfusions,4 drugs,5 and other such items which
are intended for intimate bodily use as part of a service. In com-
parison with others, however, this defense has been seldom used,
making any judicial consideration of it, whether direct or indirect,
of more than passing importance.
In Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co.,' a federal district court,
applying North Dakota law, held sub silentio that a technical sale
is not a necessary element for an implied warranty action against the
manufacturer of a vaccine which was administered to the plaintiff by
his physician.' Stromsodt involved the drug, Quadrigen, which
1 See, e.g., Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
See generally 3 DUESENBERG & KING, SALES & BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7.01 (2) (b) (1966); 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 19.02 (1966); Farnsworth, Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales
Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 653 (1957).
2 See Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1960).
3 See, e.g., Dickens v. Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 209 A.2d 169 (DeL Super. Ct.
1965).
4 See, e.g., Goelz v. J. K. & Susie L. Wadley Research Institute & Blood Bank, 350
S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
5 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1960).
6257 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.D. 1966).
7 Id. at 992.
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contained four antigens: diptheria toxoid, tetanus toxoid, pertussis
(whooping cough) vaccine, and poliomyelitis vaccine. The plain-
tiff, an infant boy, received two injections of the drug, the first in
August 1959 and the second in October of that year. After the
second injection he suffered a violent reaction which can best be
described as a convulsion or seizure.'
Medical testimony showed that the plaintiff had suffered perma-
nent damage to the brain and central nervous system, and, at the
time of the trial, the indications were that the boy would have to
be institutionalized.9 Having found that the drug itself was defec-
tive and caused the injuries, the court granted judgment for the
plaintiff in the amount of $500,000.0 It was held that the defect
in the drug constituted a breach of the implied warranty of mer-
chantability and that lack of privity is no defense to actions by the
ultimate consumer against the manufacturer where "'through ad-
vertising or other media of education and information defendant
has convinced and persuaded the medical profession to prescribe its
drug .. .."'11
The court in Stromsodt did not directly consider the sale require-
ment in its decision. However, by holding that lack of privity is
no defense and then applying the implied warranty theory, 2 the
court necessarily decided that the requirement of a sale does not bar
an action against the manufacturer of a drug which the consumer
received from his doctor as part of the doctor's medical treatment
or services.'"
If Stromsodt is followed in the future by the North Dakota
courts, it will place North Dakota with the small but growing num-
ber of states that have begun to whittle away at the requirement
of a technical sale in order to find implied warranties.'4
8 Id. at 993.
9 Id. at 994.
10 Id. at 998.
11 Id. at 995, citing Bennet v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Ill.
1964). The court also held that the defendant was liable in tort for negligence, thus
finding for the plaintiff in both warranty and negligence. 257 F. Supp. at 996-97.
12 Id. at 994-95.
13 Accord, Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
14 See Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., supra note 13; Russell v. Community Blood
Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). See generally Farnsworth, supra
note 1; Rheingold, Products Liability - The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18
RurTGMS L REv. 692 (1965); Note, Drug Liability - Survey, Study, and Progress, 16
W. REs. L. REV. 392 (1965); Note, Should the Doctrine of Implied Warranties Be
Limited to Sales Transactions?, 2 VAND. L R v. 675 (1949).
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Further, Stromsodt follows the lead of a California court in the
Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs. 5 case, which was one of the first to
consider the sale requirement for implied warranty in the situation
involving drugs administered to the patient by his physician. In
addition to the lack-of-sale argument, the defendant in Cutter as-
serted that as a matter of public policy there should be no recovery
on implied warranties where "new drugs" were involved.' " The
court found this argument unpersuasive when the product caused
the very disease it was designed to prevent." However, the ques-
tion of whether such an argument would be valid in cases where a
new drug causes harmful side effects was not considered. If the in-
juries in Stromsodt are viewed as harmful side effects of the defec-
tive vaccine,"8 then Stromsodt has extended Cutter one step further
so that "new drugs" do not enjoy immunity from breach of war-
ranty claims whether they cause the disease they are designed to pre-
vent or cause harmful side effects.
Stromsodt would therefore indicate a broadening of implied
warranty protection. If the trend continues, the sale requirement
for warranty actions might well be eliminated, at least in cases in-
volving a combined sale of goods and services.' 9 It should be noted,
however, that there is a solid line of cases which have not permitted
recovery in warranty because the transaction was primarily a ser-
vice;2" and, of course, where privity is still required for warranty
actions, the case is usually dispensed with on this ground, and the
sale-service question is never reached.2'
The position of the Ohio courts on this question is not com-
pletely dear. There appears to be no Ohio case directly related to
the vaccine situations in Stromsodt and Cutter. However, Ohio's
latest pronouncement on the privity question may indicate how such
15 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
16 Id. at 611, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
'7 Ibid.
18 A close reading of the court's medical findings would seem to support this con-
struction. 257 F. Supp. at 995.
19 The final step, of course, would be to allow implied warranty recovery in pure
service situations. This, however, is a much different case from those in which there is
both a sale and a service and in which one or the other predominates. For a discussion
of several cases involving a service only, including such arrangements as bailments and
leases or rentals of equipment, see generally 3 DUESENBERG & KING, op. cit. supra note
1, § 7.01(2)(b); 2 FRuMER & FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 19.02; Farnsworth,
supra note 1.
2 0 See, e.g., Foley Corp. v. Dove, 101 A.2d 841 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1954); Vic-
tor v. Barzaleski, 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 698 (Luzerne County Ct. 1959).
21 See, e.g., Berry v. American Cyanamid Co., 341 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1965).
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a case would be decided. In Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp.,22 the
Ohio Supreme Court held "that there can be an action in tort, based
upon breach of [implied] warranty, and no contractual relation be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant is required., 2' This relieves
the plaintiff of the more onerous burden of proving negligence.
Instead, he need merely prove that the product was defective at the
time the manufacturer sold it, that the defect caused the injury or
damage to the plaintiff while the product was being used for its
ordinary and intended purpose, that the defect was the proximate
cause of the injury, and that the plaintiff's use of or proximity to
the defective product could reasonably have been anticipated."
The classification of a breach of warranty as a tort has a signifi-
cant effect upon the lack-of-sale defense. This defense can be as-
serted only where the cause of action for breach of implied warranty
is based on contract, the argument being that a sale of goods is nec-
essary to support an implied warranty.25 Such a plea would there-
fore have no validity in tort actions for breach of implied warranty
which are not limited to sales transactions. It would thus be diffi-
cult to imagine how the fact that part of the vaccine treatment con-
sisted of a service could be raised in Ohio as a defense to recovery
upon an implied warranty. Therefore, the plaintiff in Stromsodt
could also have recovered in Ohio, provided that the cause of action
were made out to be an action in tort.
DAVID L. ROSENZWEIG
22 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.-2d 185 (1966).
23 Id. at 236, 218 N.E2d at 192. The court noted that there may also be an im
plied warranty based on contract. This is the Uniform Commercial Code type of war-
ranty which arises from the contractual relationship between a buyer and seller. Id.
at 234, 218 NE.2d at 189-90. The implied warranty relied upon by the court as a
basis for the action in tort arose when the manufacturer put his product on the market.
By doing so, he impliedly warranted that it was safe for its ordinary and intended pur-
poses. Id. at 235-36, 218 N.E.2d at 190.
24 Id. at 237, 218 N.B.2d at 192-93.
25 See, e.g., Permutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 104-05, 123 N.E.2d
792, 794 (1954).
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